The Wisdom of Twitter Crowds:Predicting Stock Market Reactions to FOMC Meetings via Twitter Feeds by Azar, Pablo Daniel & Lo, Andrew W
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2756815 
The Wisdom of Twitter Crowds:
Predicting Stock Market Reactions to
FOMC Meetings via Twitter Feeds
Pablo D. Azar and Andrew W. Lo
This Draft: March 11, 2016
Pablo D. Azar is a PhD student in the Department of Economics and Labo-
ratory for Financial Engineering, Sloan School of Management, MIT. Email:
pazar@mit.edu
Andrew W. Lo is Charles E. and Susan T. Harris Professor and the Director of the
Laboratory for Financial Engineering, Sloan School of Management, MIT. Email:
alo-admin@mit.edu
Abstract
With the rise of social media, investors have a new tool to measure sentiment in real time.
However, the nature of these sources of data raises serious questions about its quality. Since
anyone on social media can participate in a conversation about markets—whether they are
informed or not—it is possible that this data may have very little information about future
asset prices. In this paper, we show that this is not the case by analyzing a recurring
event that has a high impact on asset prices: Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)
meetings. We exploit a new dataset of tweets referencing the Federal Reserve and show that
the content of tweets can be used to predict future returns, even after controlling for common
asset pricing factors. To gauge the economic magnitude of these predictions, the authors
construct a simple hypothetical trading strategy based on this data. They find that a tweet-
based asset-allocation strategy outperforms several benchmarks, including a strategy that
buys and holds a market index as well as a comparable dynamic asset allocation strategy
that does not use Twitter information.
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Investor sentiment has frequently been considered an important factor in determining
asset prices. Traditionally, sentiment is measured by observing analyst estimates, survey
data, news stories, and technical indicators such as put/call ratios and relative strength
indicators. Two drawbacks of these indicators are that they are based on a relatively sparse
subset of the population of investors and, except for technical indicators, are not measured
in real time. The rise of social media allows us to overcome these drawbacks and measure
the sentiment of a large number of individuals in real time. These data sources give the
quantitative investor a new tool with which to construct portfolios and manage risk.
However, because social media data is generated by individual users and not investment
professionals, the following questions arise about the quality of this data:
• Do user messages contain relevant information for asset pricing?
• Can this information be inferred from more traditional sources, or is it truly new
information?
• Can social media data help predict future asset returns and shifts in volatility?
To answer these questions, we focus on a single recurring event that reveals previously
unknown information to the market: Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings.
Eight times a year, the FOMC meets to determine monetary policy. The decisions made
by the FOMC are highly watched by all market participants, and often have a significant
impact on asset prices.1
To understand how investors on social media behave around FOMC meeting dates, we
create a new dataset of tweets that cite the Federal Reserve. Using natural language pro-
cessing techniques, we can assign a polarity score to each Twitter message, identifying the
emotion in the text. We show that this polarity score can be used to predict the returns of
the CRSP Value-Weighted Index, even when limiting ourselves to articles and tweets that
are published at least 24 hours before the FOMC meeting.
We use these results to construct trading strategies that bet more or less aggressively in
a market index depending on Twitter sentiment. We find that portfolios using Twitter data
can significantly outperform a passive buy-and-hold strategy.
1(Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005; Cieslak, Morse, and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2014; Lucca and Moench, 2015).
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Literature Review
There are now many studies that use social network data to analyze financial assets. Bar-
Haim, Dinur, Feldman, Fresko, and Goldstein (2011) show that some users are “experts”,
in the sense that they are more consistently right about stock price movement than other
users. Identifying these experts is useful for predicting asset movement using tweet data. The
question remains on whether these experts are themselves influencing prices (by influencing
others’ beliefs and trades), or whether their tweets simply reflect existing market information
better than non-sophisticated users’ tweets. Giannini, Irvine, and Shu (2014) show that local
investors are more likely to have accurate information about companies located in their area
than non-local investors. Plakandaras, Papadimitriou, Gogas, and Diamantaras (2014) use
social media data to predict changes in exchange rates using machine learning methods.
Our paper differs from the existing literature in that we look at social media’s reaction to
a significant and recurring macroeconomic event, instead of analyzing events for individual
equities.
Several studies have documented the fact that FOMC decisions have a significant impact
on stock prices.2 The analyses in the existing literature typically focus on easily quantifiable
information. For example, Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) show that an unexpected 25-basis-
point cut in the federal funds rate target induces a one percent rise in broad stock indices.
The “surprise” component of the interest rate policy is measured as the deviation of the
announced interest rate from that predicted via a vector auto-regression (VAR) model that
an investor could calibrate based on previous decisions. One issue with this type of analysis
is that it is not immediate that the VAR model captures investor sentiment, and it is not
applicable during long periods of zero interest rates, such as the recent period between
December 2008 and December 2015.
One important paper to highlight is that of Lucca and Moench (2015). They show that a
significant fraction of the risk premium is earned on the 24 hours before the FOMC decision
is announced, and suggests that a strategy that increases its equity holdings on the days
before the FOMC decision should outperform the market. Surprisingly, we show that during
2(Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005; Gurkaynak, Sack, and Swanson, 2005; Cieslak, Morse, and Vissing-
Jorgensen, 2014; Lucca and Moench, 2015).
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the 2010-2014 period that we study, such a strategy does not outperform,3 while a strategy
that adjusts its positions on FOMC decision days based on tweets performs much better.
Our main contribution is thus to add text data to the number of signals that we can use
to measure the effect of the FOMC on markets. Furthermore—and in contrast to existing
work on the FOMC and text4—we focus on text data generated by investors themselves
and not by the FOMC. An advantage of this approach is that the information generated by
investors appears before the FOMC announces their decisions, and can be incorporated in
trading strategies that seek to anticipate market reactions to the FOMC meeting.
Data
We collected tweets using the Topsy API.5 We gathered English language tweets between
2007 and 2014 that mentioned the terms “FOMC” or “Federal Reserve”. We also gathered
English language tweets that mentioned “Bernanke” or “Yellen” depending on whether the
tweets were posted during Bernanke’s term or Yellen’s term.
Tweet sentiment was computed by using a Python package called “Pattern” (De Smedt
and Daelemans, 2012). The outcome of this process is that each tweet is associated with a
polarity score between −1 and +1 (−1 for purely negative and +1 for purely positive). We
describe the process in slightly more detail in the appendix, and refer the interested reader to
De Smedt and Daelemans’ guide to the software package (De Smedt and Daelemans, 2012) for
a more thorough description. Exhibit 1 shows some example tweets with their polarity scores,
including some misclassified tweets that show how the algorithm may sometimes not capture
sentiment about the Federal Reserve itself, but about other actors (e.g: “@jordangunderson:
is proud that Jason Chaffetz is 1 of 28 Congressmen cosponsoring Ron Paul’s Federal Reserve
Transparency Act (HR 1207)”.)
Each tweet is also associated with the number of followers of the user who posted the
tweet. Following Giannini, Irvine, and Shu (2014), we weigh the polarity of each tweet
by the number of people following the user who posted the tweet to measure the tweet’s
3This may be due to the fact that our sample consists mostly of years after which the results of (Lucca
and Moench, 2015) became known.
4(Lucca and Trebbi, 2009; Azar, Li, and Lo, 2015; Jegadeesh and Wu, 2015)
5The API we used was originally available at http://otter.topsy.api. Unfortunately Topsy is no
longer making this API available.
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reach. For each day t, we construct a measure of tweet sentiment on day t by averaging
the weighted polarities of the tweets on that day. Exhibit 2 summarizes the daily average
weighted polarity, as well as the number of tweets and the average unweighted polarity. We
also include the z-statistic from the augmented Dickey Fuller test for average polarity and
average weighted polarity, to show that these series are likely stationary.
Exhibit 3 shows a time series plot of the average weighted polarity for each day between
2009 and 2014. Exhibit 4 shows the distribution of tweets during the year 2014. The spikes
occur at times when the FOMC was meeting. Exhibit 5 shows a smoothed time series for
the number of tweets per day between 2007 and 2014. We can see from exhibit 5 that tweets
concerning the Federal Reserve were very scarce before 2009. Due to the scarcity of data
before 2009, we restrict our study to the 2009–2014 period. We can also see from exhibit 5
that the smoothed series for number of tweets is not stationary, which is likely due to the
growth in number of users between 2009 and 2014.
We use WRDS to obtain daily values for market returns and Fama French factors.
Tweet Polarity
@GStuedler this was caused by the worst regulation of all time,
the Federal Reserve Act of 1913. Decoupled money from reality
#topprog #tcot
−1.00
@SenJohnMcCain Maybe instead of partisan bickering, you
should all come together and go after the real bad guys... The
Federal Reserve
−1.00
Bernanke Says Biggest Worry is That Politicians Abandon
Banks: (CEP News) - U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Be..
http://tinyurl.com/cosb9m
−0.75
Treasurys rise as Fed meets: Treasury prices rose Tues-
day amid speculation that the Federal Reserve will begin b..
http://tinyurl.com/c42qjb
0.60
RT @jordangunderson: is proud that Jason Chaffetz is 1 of 28
Congressmen cosponsoring Ron Paul’s Federal Reserve Trans-
parency Act (HR 1207).
0.80
Very impressed w/Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke! 1.00
Exhibit 1: Example tweets with polarity scores.
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Variable Mean SD Min Max Median DF
Num. Tweets Per Day 254.2 328.2 0 3445 158
Avg. Polarity Per Day 0.0875 0.0761 −0.307 0.5 0.09 −30.348
Avg. Weighted Polarity Per Day 1141.0 5167.322 −33752.71 122957.5 601.2 −38.650
Exhibit 2: Summary statistics. The ‘DF’ column contains Dickey-Fuller test statistic. N =
1, 507.
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Exhibit 3: Average weighted polarity of tweets over time for the 2009–2014 period.
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Exhibit 4: Number of tweets over the year 2014 mentioning the key words.
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Exhibit 5: Smoothed number of tweets over time for the 2007–2014 period.
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Regression Results
We show that tweets can be used to predict future returns and volatility, even after controlling
for other factors. Exhibit 6 contains the results of regressions of the form:
Rt = α + β1IndicatorFOMCt + β2TweetPolarityt−1 + β3TweetPolarityFOMCt−1 +
+γ1HMLt + γ2SMBt + γ3UMDt + γ4Rt−1 + t (1)
where the dependent variable Rt is the excess daily return (in percentage terms) on the
CRSP value-weighted market index. The independent variables are
• IndicatorFOMCt: a dummy variable equal to one if and only if there was a scheduled
FOMC meeting that concluded at date t.
• TweetPolarityt−1: the average weighted polarity of tweets in the time range 4:00pm on
date t−2 to 4:00pm on date t−1. Notice that this variable is observable before market
closes on date t−1, and can be used by a strategy that determines its date-t position
at the market close of date t−1. This variable is normalized to have mean zero and
variance 1.
• TweetPolarityFOMCt−1 = IndicatorFOMCt × TweetPolarityt−1: this variable is the
same as the tweet polarity variable, but is non-zero only on days when the FOMC
meets.
• HMLt, SMBt, UMDt: the Value, Size and Momentum factors.
• Rt−1, the excess market return on date t−1.
Exhibit 6 shows four different regressions illustrating the effect of omitting or adding
certain variables. From the exhibit we can see that excess returns are significantly higher—
by about 0.3 percent—during our sample period when the FOMC meets. We can also see
that tweet polarity on date t−1 can be used to predict returns on date t, and that this
effect intensifies on days when the FOMC meets. Finally, we see that even if we account
for contemporaneous movement in factors, tweet polarity on date t−1 is still significantly
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correlated with returns on date t, suggesting that—on days the FOMC meets—tweets have
information that is not conveyed by market factors.
One important result to take away from exhibit 6 is that, once we account for the Fama
French factors, the effect of Twitter sentiment on returns becomes negligible, except on
days in which the FOMC meets. On these days, a one standard deviation increase in tweet
sentiment will increase returns by 0.62 percent.
In the next section, we show that these regression results can be used to build trading
strategies based on tweet information that outperform the market on multiple performance
metrics.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Return Return Return Return
IndicatorFOMC 0.331* 0.338* 0.398** 0.343**
(0.187) (0.187) (0.177) (0.140)
TweetPolarity 0.0510** 0.0493* 0.0156
(0.0249) (0.0252) (0.0195)
TweetPolarityFOMC 0.490 0.625**
(0.529) (0.296)
hml 0.843***
(0.0757)
smb 0.857***
(0.0640)
umd -0.141**
(0.0602)
L.Return -0.0722* -0.0715* -0.0716* -0.0334
(0.0384) (0.0384) (0.0384) (0.0296)
Constant 0.0630** 0.0628** 0.0628** 0.0516**
(0.0313) (0.0312) (0.0313) (0.0246)
Observations 1,506 1,506 1,506 1,506
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Exhibit 6: Regression of daily returns (in percent) on tweet polarity, FOMC meeting
indicator, and Fama French factors. The interaction term is equal to TweetPolarity ×
IndicatorFOMC. Newey-West standard errors are computed using 4 lags.
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Assessing Investment Impact
To develop a sense of the practical value of Twitter sentiment to investors, we simulate
a simple trading strategy based on the Kelly Criterion. Suppose we invest in one risky
asset and one risk-free asset and rebalance the position every day based on our forecast of
tomorrow’s risky-asset return. For simplicity, assume that the risk-free rate is Rf,t, and that
the risky asset’s returns on date t are drawn from a normal distribution N (µt, σ2t ) with mean
µt and variance σ
2
t .
We wish to choose a fraction ft of our wealth every day to invest in the risky asset (if
our time t wealth is wt, then our total investment in the risky asset will be ft · wt). Under
the assumption of a logarithmic utility function, the optimal investment strategy is to invest
the fraction:
f ∗t =
µt −Rf,t
σ2t
. (2)
This policy also maximizes the expected geometric growth rate of the portoflio. If f ∗t <0 or
f ∗t >1, we need to shortsell the risky asset or borrow (or short the riskless asset), respectively.
We assume that there is some bound L on the leverage and shortselling available, so that
−L ≤ f ∗t ≤ L. We also consider more conservative investment policies by multiplying f ∗t
by a constant τ ∈ (0, 1) to yield “fractional-Kelly” policies. This, in combination with the
leverage and shortsales constraints, results in the following portfolio strategy:
f˜t(τ) =

τ(µt−Rf,t)
σ2t
if −L ≤ τ(µt−Rf,t)
σ2t
≤ L
−L if τ(µt−Rf,t)
σ2t
≤ −L
L if
τ(µt−Rf,t)
σ2t
≥ L .
(3)
In our empirical analysis below, τ is set to 1
4
, 1
2
and 1.
To compute the portfolio weights, we need a model of returns that produces a prediction
of the mean µˆt and variance σˆ
2
t of the CRSP return for each date t. We use linear models of
the form
Rt = α + βXt + t (4)
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where Rt is the excess return of the CRSP value-weighted market index, in excess of the
risk-free rate Rf,t, and Xt is a vector of signals that are observed before time t. In this case,
the model predictions are:
µˆt = E[Rt|Xt] = α + βXt (5)
σˆ2t = Var[Rt|Xt] = Var[α + βXt + t] . (6)
To quantify the investment value of Twitter sentiment, we consider four models, corre-
sponding to different choices of Xt:
Model 1: Xt is an empty vector, so the linear model is just Rt = α + t
Model 2: Xt = (IndicatorFOMCt)
Model 3: Xt = (IndicatorFOMCt,TweetPolarityt−1)
Model 4: Xt = (IndicatorFOMCt,TweetPolarityt−1 · IndicatorFOMCt)
The first model is the most basic, and does not capture the fact that the distribution of
market returns can change on FOMC announcement dates. The second model adds an
indicator variable to account for this change in the distribution of returns. The third model
includes this indicator variable as well as our Twitter polarity measure on date t−1. The
fourth model differs from the third only in that the Twitter polarity is interacted with the
FOMC indicator, so that it is nonzero only on days when FOMC decisions are announced.
Each model will correspond to different estimates for αˆ, βˆ, and therefore different portfolio
weights {f˜t(τ)} implemented on each date. The profitability of the models gives us a measure
of the information content of tweets. If the third model is the most profitable, then tweets
about the Fed always carry information, even if they are made on periods when the Fed
does not make decisions. But if the fourth model is the most profitable, then tweets made
on days far away from Fed decisions are more likely to be “noise”, while tweets made right
before the FOMC announcement are likely to be informative.
In a realistic simulation, we do not observe information from date t+1 when trading on
day t. Thus, we cannot calibrate a model that will be used to predict Rt using tweets or
returns from any date beyond t. In order to avoid this look-ahead bias, we initialize our
10
portfolio simulations on January 2010. The models that are used to predict 2010 returns
are trained only with data from 2009. The models that are used to predict 2011 returns are
trained only with data from 2010 and 2011, and so forth.6
Exhibit 7 shows the manager’s wealth over the 2010–2014 period for all four strategies
using the quarter-Kelly criterion. The first row of the figure shows the results when the
models are estimated on the entire 2010–2014 period, and thus are subject to look-ahead
bias. The second row of the figure in exhibit 7 shows the out-of-sample results, where the
model used to trade in year T is trained only with data from years before T . The columns
correspond to different caps on leverage. We can see that, with high leverage, our models
that use social media information outperform the models that use only market returns and
FOMC indicators as predictors.
Exhibit 8 shows the performance metrics for the different portfolios using the out-of-
sample estimation of the regressions and the quarter-Kelly criterion. The first column indi-
cates which model is used to predict performance. The second column gives the bound L on
the amount of leverage used, with L set to either 1, 2 or 4. The following columns show the
annualized portfolio returns, the maximum drawdown, the annualized sharpe and informa-
tion ratios, annualized alpha, and beta.7 As can be seen from the exhibit, our strategies that
uses information from tweets outperform when leverage is 2:1 or 4:1 and they have higher
returns and higher information ratios than a strategy that just invests in a levered market
index or a strategy that only uses the FOMC indicator as a signal. Furthermore, model 4
(where tweets are used only on days when the FOMC meets) outperforms model 3 (where
tweets are used to predict returns every day). This suggests that the information value of
social media is higher when there is real economic news.
It is important to highlight here that our fourth strategy (which uses tweet informa-
tion only on days the FOMC is scheduled to meet) follows the CRSP value-weighted index
passively every day except for eight trading days a year, and yet significantly outperforms
the levered market benchmark with high information ratios. Model 2—which does not use
6One possible objection with our approach is that we do not have historical data for the number of
followers of a Twitter user. Thus, we use the number of followers that the users had in August 2015. If users
who are more accurate gained more followers between 2009 and 2014 due to their accuracy, this can bias our
results. We leave this question for future work.
7The information ratio for strategy i ∈ {2, 3, 4} is computed as E[Ri−R1]√
Var[Ri−R1]
√
252, where Ri is the return
of strategy i and R1 is the return on the Levered market strategy with leverage cap L.
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Exhibit 7: Wealth over the 2010–2014 period for four strategies using the quarter-Kelly
criterion.
Twitter data—underperforms model 4, showing that information from social media can be
very helpful for tactical asset allocation.
Exhibits 9 and 10 shows analogous results using the half-Kelly and full-Kelly criteria. As
with the quarter-Kelly criterion, we can see that the portfolio metrics improve when using
Twitter information in our prediction models.
Analysis of Portfolio Weights
To develop a better understanding of the practical implications of social-media data, consider
the portfolio weights of our hypothetical trading strategies. Exhibit 11 shows the weight that
the four strategies put on equities when they use a quarter-Kelly criterion and leverage 4.
Note that models 2 and 4 change their position very infrequently (mostly on FOMC meeting
days), and they behave very similarly: when the FOMC does not meet, these strategies use
none or very little leverage. Model 2 increases its leverage to 4 every single day the FOMC
meets. Model 4 is similarly aggressive, except on five days when Twitter sentiment was so
12
Strategy L Return Drawdown Sharpe Info. Ratio Beta Alpha
Model 1 1.00 13.08 -7.77 0.88 0.94 -0.83
(0.00) (0.00)
Model 2 1.00 10.97 -4.89 0.88 -0.76 0.78 -0.67
(0.00) (0.00)
Model 3 1.00 12.87 -7.84 0.92 -0.11 0.85 0.18
(0.01) (0.00)
Model 4 1.00 14.06 -8.19 0.93 0.33 0.94 0.17
(0.01) (0.00)
Model 1 2.00 13.47 -7.77 0.87 0.99 -1.10
(0.00) (0.00)
Model 2 2.00 13.04 -3.72 0.93 -0.15 0.83 0.60
(0.01) (0.00)
Model 3 2.00 15.95 -9.26 0.95 0.35 0.97 1.52
(0.01) (0.00)
Model 4 2.00 17.11 -7.35 0.98 0.72 1.06 1.41
(0.01) (0.00)
Model 1 4.00 13.47 -7.77 0.87 0.99 -1.10
(0.00) (0.00)
Model 2 4.00 16.75 -2.71 0.91 0.28 0.93 3.16
(0.02) (0.00)
Model 3 4.00 20.54 -7.95 0.97 0.55 1.08 4.66
(0.02) (0.00)
Model 4 4.00 22.53 -5.42 1.07 0.82 1.14 5.46
(0.02) (0.00)
Exhibit 8: Out-of-sample performance metrics for our four strategies under different levels
of leverage caps and the quarter-Kelly criterion. The information ratio is computed using
the “levered market” strategy as a benchmark.
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Strategy L Return Drawdown Sharpe Info. Ratio Beta Alpha
Model 1 1.00 14.84 -8.19 0.94 1.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Model 2 1.00 14.84 -8.19 0.94 1.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Model 3 1.00 15.32 -7.27 0.98 0.13 0.97 0.89
(0.00) (0.00)
Model 4 1.00 15.91 -8.19 1.00 0.35 0.99 1.14
(0.00) (0.00)
Model 1 2.00 24.74 -16.56 0.88 1.89 -1.66
(0.00) (0.00)
Model 2 2.00 21.02 -10.42 0.88 -0.76 1.57 -1.33
(0.01) (0.00)
Model 3 2.00 24.70 -16.41 0.92 -0.11 1.71 0.37
(0.01) (0.00)
Model 4 2.00 26.85 -17.49 0.93 0.33 1.88 0.34
(0.01) (0.00)
Model 1 4.00 25.23 -16.56 0.87 1.99 -2.19
(0.01) (0.00)
Model 2 4.00 25.10 -7.61 0.93 -0.15 1.67 1.20
(0.02) (0.00)
Model 3 4.00 30.46 -19.59 0.95 0.35 1.94 3.06
(0.02) (0.00)
Model 4 4.00 32.67 -16.21 0.98 0.72 2.11 2.84
(0.02) (0.00)
Exhibit 9: Out-of-sample performance metrics for our four strategies under different levels
of leverage caps and the half-Kelly criterion. The information ratio is computed using the
“levered market” strategy as a benchmark.
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Strategy L Return Drawdown Sharpe Info. Ratio Beta Alpha
Model 1 1.00 14.84 -8.19 0.94 1.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Model 2 1.00 14.84 -8.19 0.94 1.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Model 3 1.00 14.99 -7.44 0.95 0.04 0.98 0.44
(0.00) (0.00)
Model 4 1.00 15.91 -8.19 1.00 0.35 0.99 1.14
(0.00) (0.00)
Model 1 2.00 28.29 -17.49 0.94 0 2.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Model 2 2.00 28.29 -17.49 0.94 2.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Model 3 2.00 29.52 -16.29 0.98 0.13 1.93 1.79
(0.01) (0.00)
Model 4 2.00 30.70 -17.49 1.00 0.35 1.97 2.30
(0.01) (0.00)
Model 1 4.00 40.70 -36.44 0.88 3.78 -3.29
(0.01) (0.00)
Model 2 4.00 36.53 -28.43 0.88 -0.76 3.13 -2.63
(0.02) (0.00)
Model 3 4.00 42.68 -35.36 0.92 -0.11 3.41 0.73
(0.03) (0.00)
Model 4 4.00 45.30 -37.58 0.93 0.33 3.75 0.67
(0.02) (0.00)
Exhibit 10: Out-of-sample performance metrics for our four strategies under different levels
of leverage caps and the full-Kelly criterion. The information ratio is computed using the
“levered market” strategy as a benchmark.
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Exhibit 11: Kelly fractions over the 2010–2014 period for four strategies with the quarter-
Kelly criterion and a leverage cap of 4.
negative that the strategy decides to reduce its leverage, or even go short. This is only a
small number of trading days, but their effect on the portfolio behavior is important. We
illustrate this by analyzing the two days where model 4 went short : January 26, 2011 and
September 21, 2011. On January 26, the market return was 0.6%, giving model 4 a loss of
1.4% and model 2 a gain of 0.24%. On September 21, 2011, the market had a very negative
reaction to the Fed’s announcement of Operation Twist. The market return was −2.9%.
Model 2 lost 11.68% of their assets on that day, while model 4 used the Twitter negativity
before the announcement to take a short position and had a 3.9% gain.
As the models were retrained every year, model 2 learned that very large losses can come
on Fed days, while model 4 explained this loss using Twitter sentiment. This allowed model
4 to bet more aggressively during the 2012-2013 periods, which were very good years for
equities which showed strong positive market reactions to FOMC decisions.
We can observe this effect in the weights used by the full-Kelly strategies (Exhibit 12).
Model 4 bets aggressively on all days, with leverage close to the maximum. It takes very
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Exhibit 12: Kelly fractions over the 2010–2014 period for four strategies with the full-Kelly
criterion and a leverage cap of 4.
strong short bets on January and September 2011, and uses the additional information it has
to forecast a higher value (and therefore, use higher leverage) on days on which the FOMC
does not meet.
Conclusion
A priori, it is not immediate that tweets contain information about asset prices, especially
since individuals who tweet are not necessarily sophisticated or even invested in the market.
In this paper, we show that these tweets do contain information, which can be used to predict
returns even after controlling for common market factors. Furthermore, the information from
tweets can be used to build portfolios that outperform on several dimensions a comparably
levered benchmark market portfolio.
A caveat to our results is that the period for which tweets are available is one of rising
markets and zero interest rates. It will be interesting to observe if this strategy continues to
outperform the market during environments where the market index is receding and interest
17
rates increase.
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Appendix
The Pattern algorithm for sentiment analysis assigns a polarity score between −1 and +1
to a given input text. This algorithm relies on the SentiWordnet database to assign scores.
SentiWordnet is an annotated dictionary where each word is associated with multiple mean-
ings, and each meaning is mapped to a triplet of numbers (p, n, o) measuring the positivity,
negativity and objectivity of the word. The sum of the three numbers always adds up to
one. For example, the word “good” may have one of the following meanings
• “Having desirable or positive qualities especially those suitable for a thing specified.”
The triplet for this meaning is (p, n, o) = (0.75, 0, 0.25).
• “Commodity. Article of commerce”. The triplet for this meaning is (p, n, o) = (0, 0, 1).
The Pattern algorithm takes a tweet with n words and parses it into an array (m1,m2, . . . ,mn)
of groups of words. If a word is an adjective or an adverb, it can amplify or decrease the
polarity of a noun that they are modifying. A typical example is “not good”, which has
a negative polarity, instead of a positive polarity. The algorithm finishes by averaging the
polarities of all groups of words, and assigning this score to the tweet.
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